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Abstract: The notion of solution plays a crucial role in the conceptual system of 
Léon Walras, the founder of the General Equilibrium Theory (GET). In this paper, 
after introducing the two solution concepts employed by Walras in the development 
of his version of GET, respectively called the “theoretical” and the “practical” 
solution, we discuss the problems such peculiar conception gives rise to, as well as 
the attempts Walras makes to dodge them. Then we explain why and to what extent 
Pareto, Walras’ immediate successor and co-founder of GET, departs from Walras’ 
original conception, progressively developing an independent viewpoint on the issue 
of equilibrium computability in GET. (JEL: B13, B21, B31, B41, C62, C68, D50) 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of solution plays a crucial role in the conceptual system of 
Léon Walras, the founder of General Equilibrium Theory (henceforth, GET). 
In this paper we want to discuss the twofold meaning attached to this notion 
by Walras, the problems such peculiar conception gives rise to, as well as the 
attempts Walras makes to dodge them. After that, we intend to explain why 
and to what extent Vilfredo Pareto, Walras’s immediate successor and co-
founder of GET, departs from the Walrasian conception, eventually 
developing an interpretation of GET where the issue of the solvability of 
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general equilibrium models is viewed in a way which significantly differs 
from that originally suggested by Walras. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Walras’s 
perspective: precisely, in subsection 2.1 we introduce the distinction between 
the two solution concepts employed by Walras in the development of his 
version of GET, called the “theoretical” and the “practical” solution, 
respectively; subsection 2.2 analyzes the “theoretical” solution, while 
subsection 2.3 examines the “practical” one. Section 3 focuses instead on 
Pareto’s perspective: precisely, subsection 3.1 analyzes Pareto’s attitude 
towards Walras’s interpretation of the solution concept in GET; subsection 
3.2 examines the evolution of Pareto’s ideas about equilibrium computability 
in GET; finally, subsection 3.3 discusses the influence exerted by Pareto’s 
mature position on the computability issue on some later conceptions, such as 
Hayek’s, of the ultimate significance of GET. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Walras’s Perspective 
Walras’s reflections on the meaning and use of the solution concept in 
general equilibrium models are spread all over his scientific production, 
starting from the four mémoires separately written and published by Walras 
in the period 1874-1877 (Walras 1874, 1876a, 1876b, 1877). The draft of 
these mémoires is strictly intertwined with that of the first edition of the 
Eléments d’économie politique pure, Walras’s fundamental theoretical work, 
published in two installments in the same period. During Walras’s lifetime 
three further editions of the Eléments were sent to press, in 1889 (II edition), 
1896 (III edition), and 1900 (IV edition), respectively1. 
In all the above quoted writings, and especially in the Eléments, Walras 
develops his theoretical system through a sequence of stages, by means of a 
peculiar constructive and expository method that will partly survive in the 
subsequent evolution of GET. Walras’s method consists in elaborating a 
sequence of nested models, arranged in order of increasing scope: the models 
are nested in the sense that the descriptive power of each model is larger than 
that of its predecessor in the sequence (provided that such a predecessor 
                                                     
1 Since 1988 a critical variorum edition of the Eléments is available, which allows the 
scholar to easily compare the text of the various editions; in the following, therefore, we shall 
always refer to this edition, contained in vol. VIII of the Œuvres économiques complètes 
d’Auguste et de Léon Walras. When quoting from the critical variorum edition we shall adopt 
the following convention: Walras (1988, page number(s) of the critical edition, number(s) of 
the original edition(s) in bold); if the text remains unaltered in all the editions, no edition 
number is specified. 
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exists); from a phenomenical point of view, therefore, each model contains 
the preceding one and is contained in the following (provided that such 
predecessor and/or successor exist). Three models are fully developed in the 
four mémoires as well as in all the editions of the Eléments: they are the so-
called models of exchange, production, and capital formation2. In the fourth 
edition, however, Walras explicitly puts forward a fourth model which, 
beyond dealing with the issues already discussed in the third, tackles the 
questions of circulating capital and money as well.  
2.1. Walras’s twofold solution concept. - According to Walras, the economic 
theorist, after formalizing a given problem by means of a suitable 
mathematical model, ought to complete his task by both explaining how the 
model concerned can be “solved” and identifying the correspondent 
“solution”. Specifically, referring to the formal models of which his version 
of GET consists, Walras makes it clear that, in order to solve each model, one 
needs to resort to a special two-stage procedure, each stage being associated 
to a particular solution concept. The following passage clearly illustrates 
Walras’s position in this respect: 
Or, pour démontrer que des prix de marchandises, qui sont des quantités, 
[...] résultent effectivement de telles ou telles données ou conditions, il est 
absolument indispensable à mon sens: 1° de formuler, d'après ces données ou 
conditions, un système d'équations, en nombre rigoureusement égal à celui des 
inconnues, dont les quantités en question soient les racines, et 2° d'établir que 
l'enchaînement des phénomènes de la réalité constitue bien la résolution 
empirique de ce système d'équations. C'est ce que j'ai fait en ce qui concernait 
successivement l'échange, la production et la capitalisation.3
As can be seen, to solve a model in Walras’s sense means to take two 
sequential steps: the first leads to a solution concept which is referred to by 
Walras as either the “theoretical” or the “mathematical” or even the 
                                                     
2 As a matter of fact, there exist two nested versions of the model of exchange: the first one, 
which plays a merely propedeutical role, deals with a pure-exchange, two-commodity 
economy with an arbitrary finite number of traders; the second generalizes the findings of the 
first to a pure-exchange economy with an arbitrary finite number of commodities and traders. 
3 Walras (1988, p. 651). At the end of the quoted passage only the first three models put 
forward by Walras in the Eléments and related writings (namely, the models of exchange, 
production, and capital formation) are listed, while the fourth model, extending Walras’s 
analysis to circulating capital and money, is omitted. This omission is simply due to the fact 
that the quoted passage, dating back to the first edition of the Eléments, remains unchanged in 
all the subsequent editions, including the fourth one; hence, the drafting of such passage can be 
traced back to a time when the issues concerning money had not yet become the subject-matter 
of a formal model, to which Walras’s characteristic two-stage solution procedure could apply.  
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“scientific” solution; the second one, instead, leads to another sort of solution 
concept, which is labelled by him as either the “practical” or the “empirical” 
solution (Walras, 1988, pp. 93, 307, 375; 1988, p. 189, 2-4; 1988, p. 461, 4). 
Henceforth, to simplify the exposition, we shall make use of only one 
qualifier to designate either kind of notion: hence, in the sequel, the first 
solution concept will be qualified as the “theoretical” one, while the second 
will be referred to as the “practical” one. Let us now consider the two notions 
in turn, starting from the “theoretical” one, which, in Walras’s theoretical 
system, precedes the “practical” one from both an expositional and a logical 
point of view. 
2.2. The “theoretical” solution. - According to Walras, given an economic 
problem, identified by a set of distinctive “data”, “conditions” and 
“unknowns”, the first thing the theorist has to do is to construct a formal 
model of the problem concerned by specifying a “system of equations” which 
suitably incorporates the “data” and the “conditions” (parameters, functions, 
relations), as well as the “unknowns” of the problem at issue; besides that, the 
theorist has to make sure that the number of the independent equations be 
“rigorously equal to that of the unknowns” to be determined. In accordance 
with his general stance, for each of his four equilibrium models Walras takes 
care of formulating a system of ordinary algebraic equations, checking in 
each case that the number of the unknowns be the same as that of the 
independent equations of the model. The “theoretical” solution, then, is 
nothing other than the mathematical solution of the system of equations 
describing the problem under question. To any such solution one can 
associate certain specified values of all the unknown variables, which can 
then be viewed as describing an “equilibrium” of the model itself. 
When the notion of “theoretical” solution is so interpreted, two distinct 
questions naturally arise: Is the “theoretical” solution determinate? Is it 
concretely computable by the theorist? The first question, in turn, naturally 
subdivides into two distinct sub-questions: Does a “theoretical” solution 
exist? Is it unique? Hence, in the end, with regard to the “theoretical” solution 
of a model in Walras’s sense, three distinct issues can be easily identified that 
ought to be confronted by the theorist: the first has to do with the existence, 
the second with the uniqueness, and the third with the computability of a 
“theoretical” solution. Walras discusses at length all the three issues. None of 
the answers he tentatively puts forward, however, would satisfy the 
contemporary standards of rigor. 
 As far as the existence issue is concerned, Walras’s insistence on the 
equation-counting criterion might easily lead the reader to believe that the 
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required equality between the number of the independent equations and the 
number of the unknowns to be determined does indeed represent for Walras a 
sufficient condition for the existence of a solution of the system of equations 
that, in his view, necessarily provides the formal structure of any given 
equilibrium model. Yet the situation is more complicated than it might appear 
at first sight: for, while the equation-counting criterion is certainly not 
sufficient for justifying any claim as to the existence of a solution, as simple 
mathematical reasoning would easily confirm, it is by no means clear 
whether or not Walras consistently holds the opposite view. In fact, there are 
a few passages in his writings where his supposed faith in the power of that 
criterion seems to waver. 
In particular, in analyzing from a geometrical point of view the question of 
the existence of solutions in the simple model of a pure-exchange, two-
commodity economy, Walras arrives at the conclusion that, under certain a 
priori acceptable assumptions concerning the characteristics of the traders 
and the shapes of the excess demand curves, “[i]l n’y aurait pas de solution” 
(Walras, 1988, p. 96-97). This conclusion, however, is somewhat 
paradoxical, since it concedes more than is actually implied by the example 
concerned. In fact, what Walras is supposing in his illustration is that the 
maximum price (say, sp  ≥ 0) at which the assumedly non-decreasing 
aggregate direct supply function of either commodity is nil be greater than 
the minimum price (say, dp  ≥ 0) at which the assumedly non-increasing 
aggregate direct demand function for the same commodity is nil. However, 
from these assumptions it would simply follow that the aggregate excess 
demand function for the commodity concerned is nil for the whole continuum 
of prices belonging to the interval [ dp , sp ]. From a formal point of view, 
therefore, the phenomenon that Walras is actually discussing has nothing to 
do with the possible inexistence of solutions, in the modern sense of that 
expression; rather, what he actually describes is a no-trade equilibrium 
which, while perfectly legitimate from a contemporary point of view, would 
however be associated with a continuum of equilibrium prices. Contrary to 
Walras’s suggestion, therefore, in the case under discussion the issue at stake 
would not concern the existence, but rather the uniqueness of the solution. 
Let us turn, then, to the uniqueness question. In this respect, at the very 
beginning of his theoretical construction, and referring once again to the 
simple model of a pure-exchange, two-commodity economy, Walras 
explicitly allows for the possible existence of multiple solutions or equilibria 
of the model (Walras, 1988, pp. 97-100). Having granted this possibility, 
however, he tends to confine it to the elementary case of the exchange of two 
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commodities for one another, belittling the probability of its occurrence in 
more complex situations, such as the case of the exchange of many 
commodities for each other (Walras, 1988, pp. 99-100, 242). Moreover, even 
when the possibility of multiple solutions is allowed for, their number is 
always assumed to be finite, so that the solutions are locally unique4. 
To sum up on the determinateness of the “theoretical” solution, we can 
conclude that Walras’s position on this issue is not free of ambiguities or 
mistakes: he does not clearly distinguish between the existence and the 
uniqueness questions; he is ready to admit the inexistence of a solution 
precisely when a whole continuum of solutions exists; on the contrary, he 
repeatedly stresses the relevance of the equation-counting criterion, as if the 
latter could provide a definite answer to the existence issue and even to the 
uniqueness one; finally, while admitting the possibility of multiple solutions 
in the simplest of his models, he then makes that problem substantially 
disappear in the rest of his analysis without much (or any) justification. 
Of course, it would be unfair to judge Walras’s successes and failures in 
the light of the subsequent developments of GET. This remark particularly 
applies to the issues of equilibrium existence and uniqueness, which have 
experienced such an extraordinary progress since the mid-1930s as to make 
any comparison between the present state of the art and that prevailing in 
Walras’s times almost irrelevant. All the same, a moderate resort to hindsight 
can still allow the interpreter to reap some benefits: for, by looking at the 
successful approaches to the existence and uniqueness issues that have been 
devised and implemented over the last seventy years or so, one can also hope 
to shed some light on the reasons why Walras’s original attempts at 
addressing the same questions were not crowned with success. 
The first lesson one can draw from the debate of the mid-1930s on the 
existence of an equilibrium in models of Walrasian derivation, as 
reconstructed, e.g., by Weintraub (1983), is that the existence issue cannot be 
successfully dealt with until the search for an equilibrium is not clearly 
distinguished from the search for a solution of a system of equations. Walras 
had occasionally contemplated the possibility that inequalities, instead of 
equations, might be associated with an equilibrium state: in particular, from 
the second edition of the Eléments onwards, he had acknowledged that an 
equilibrium of his capital formation model might require that some of the 
equations originally (i.e., in the first edition) employed to define the 
                                                     
4 As we have seen above, however, there is at least one passage in the Eléments which is 
consistent with the existence of what a modern theorist would interpret as a continuum of 
equilibrium prices. But, as already explained, the equilibrium nature of such prices is not 
acknowledged by Walras. 
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equilibrium conditions of that model should be turned into inequalities 
(Walras, 1988, p. 401, 2-4). This occasional recognition, however, had not 
been enough to convince him to call in question his reiterated identification 
of the equilibrium of a model with the “theoretical” solution of the equation 
system supposedly defining it. 
In fact, it is only during the debate of the mid-1930s that general 
equilibrium theorists start to accept the idea that the very concept of general 
competitive equilibrium needs to be redefined in such a way as to allow for 
the possibility that some equilibrium conditions be satisfied as strict 
inequalities, possibly associated with suitable complementary slackness 
conditions; so that, during that debate, Walras’s formal identification of the 
equilibrium concept with the concept of solution of an equation system is 
eventually abandoned. Such change in perspective, in turn, proves to be an 
important step towards a general solution of the existence issue: for, as soon 
as it is acknowledged that an equilibrium may be something different from 
the solution of an equation system, the way is paved for the exploration of 
methods of proving the existence of an equilibrium which are different from 
the traditional, inevitably unsuccessful, attempts of directly proving the 
existence of solutions of hopelessly unmanageable systems of equations. As 
is well-known, this quest will eventually lead to the employment of fixed-
point theorems in the equilibrium existence proofs. But, since we are aware 
nowadays that fixed-point theorems and equilibrium existence theorems in 
GET are essentially equivalent5, we also know that there is no other general 
way to prove the existence of an equilibrium in general equilibrium models 
than to rely on fixed-point theorems of some sort. Hence, since no such 
theorem was known in Walras’s times, this would be enough by itself to 
explain why his attempts at confronting the existence and uniqueness issues 
were necessarily doomed to failure. 
Something similar applies also to the third question concerning the 
“theoretical” solution in Walras’s sense: for, in view of the recalled 
equivalence between fixed-point theorems and equilibrium existence 
theorems in GET, one cannot but agree with Scarf (1982, p. 1015) that “any 
effective numerical procedure for computing equilibrium prices must at the 
same time be an algorithm for computing fixed points of a continuous 
mapping”. So, also with respect to the third question, we might conclude that, 
due to the lack of the necessary mathematical knowledge and skills, it would 
have been literally impossible for Walras to concretely compute the 
equilibrium values corresponding, in his view, to the “theoretical” solution of 
                                                     
5 See, e.g., Uzawa (1962).  
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any one of his equilibrium models. But, concerning computability, there is 
another issue that should be preliminarily discussed: for, given a certain 
model and an associated equation system, it is not even clear whether or not 
Walras really trusted the theorist formulating or analyzing such model to be 
actually capable to compute the “theoretical” solution, assumed to exist and 
be unique, of the equation system concerned. 
In this respect, over a time span of a few months, Walras takes two 
seemingly conflicting positions. For, in his first significant theoretical 
writing, the mémoire on the elementary theory of exchange published in 
January 1874, referring in particular to the simple problem of the exchange of 
two commodities for one another, he writes: 
 A priori, ce problème est évidemment soluble, du moins en principe, par le 
procédé mathématique, comme il est soluble, en fait, sur le marché, par le 
procédé empirique de la hausse et de la baisse. Sur notre marché, nous avons 
supposé les acheteurs et les vendeurs en présence les uns des autres; mais la 
présence des ces échangeurs n’est pas nécessaire: qu’ils donnent leurs ordres à 
des agents, le marché ce tiendra entre ces derniers. […] Mais, théoriquement, la 
présence des agents est-elle plus nécessaire que celle des échangeurs eux-
mêmes? Pas le moins du monde. Ces agents sont les exécuteurs purs et simples 
d’ordres inscrits sur des carnets: qu’au lieu de faire la criée, ils donnent ces 
carnets à un calculateur, et ce calculateur déterminera le prix d'équilibre non 
pas certes aussi rapidement, mais à coup sûr plus rigoureusement que cela ne 
pourrait se faire par le mécanisme de la hausse et de la baisse. (Walras, 1874, 
p. 37; italics added) 
Yet, on coming back to the same subject in the first installment of the first 
edition of the  Eléments, published just six months later in July 1874, Walras 
writes: 
On voit clairement à présent ce qu'est le mécanisme de la concurrence sur 
le marché; c'est la solution pratique, et par hausse et baisse des prix, du 
problème de l'échange dont nous avons fourni la solution théorique et 
mathématique. On doit comprendre d'ailleurs que notre intention n'est 
aucunement de substituer une solution à l'autre. La solution pratique est d'une 
rapidité et d'une sûreté qui ne laissent rien à désirer. On peut voir, sur de 
grands marchés fonctionnant même sans courtiers ni crieurs, le prix courant 
d'équilibre se déterminer en quelques minutes, et des quantités considérables de 
marchandise s'échanger à ce prix en deux ou trois quarts d'heure. Au contraire, 
la solution théorique serait, dans presque tous les cas, absolument 
impraticable. (Walras, 1988, p. 93; italics added) 
In both passages Walras deals with his simple model of a pure-exchange, 
two-commodity economy, whose formal structure is represented by one 
single market-clearing equation with only one unknown variable to be 
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determined, namely, the only independent relative price. Moreover, in both 
passages Walras contrasts the “theoretical” solution of the model with the 
“practical” one: while to compute the former solution would be the task, 
whose feasibility has yet to be ascertained, of the theorist who has formulated 
the model (precisely, of the “calculateur” mentioned in the first passage), to 
compute the latter is the practical or empirical task, whose feasibility is 
beyond doubt, of the “mécanisme de la concurrence sur le marché”. As to the 
“theoretical” solution, in the first passage Walras asserts that it is computable, 
at least in principle, provided that the “calculateur” be given the necessary 
information, consisting, in the case under discussion, of the knowledge of the 
individual demand functions; under this assumption, the “calculateur” can 
determine the equilibrium price less quickly, but more rigorously, than the 
competitive mechanism. On the contrary, in the second passage, Walras 
asserts that the “theoretical” solution is absolutely impracticable in almost 
every case; moreover, even granting that the “theoretical” solution could be 
computed at all, the “practical” solution provided by the competitive 
mechanism would be reached not only more quickly, but also more certainly 
than the “theoretical” one. 
That the two passages express contradictory views about the computability 
of the “theoretical” solution is an undeniable fact. Yet, the apparent conflict 
can be significantly reduced, if not completely cancelled, if one takes into 
account the different purposes pursued by Walras in writing the two 
passages. To see this, let us assume once again, in the wake of Walras, that 
the “theoretical” solution of the equation system associated with the 
equilibrium model under discussion exists and is unique. Then, under this 
assumption, let us ask why it might prove impossible to numerically compute 
such a solution. Two different reasons stand out for scrutiny: first, the theorist 
might be unable to obtain the necessary detailed information about the data 
and the conditions of the model, that is, about the parameters, functions, and 
relations on which the equation system depends; second, even granting that 
all the required quantitative information were somehow made available to the 
theorist, the latter might still be unable to numerically solve the equation 
system because no efficient algorithm is available which would allow the 
“calculateur” to actually compute such numerical solution. 
Now, in the first passage, Walras is evidently willing to address the 
computability issue under the provisional assumption, made for discussion’s 
sake, that all the necessary quantitative information, as represented by the 
individual demand functions, be actually conveyed to the “calculateur”6; 
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mind or entity can come to possess a complete knowledge of all the relevant data of the model 
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under this assumption, he is ready to express a moderately optimistic view 
about the computational skills of the “calculateur” who, in his opinion, would 
certainly be slower, but in the end more precise than the market in 
approaching the solution of the equation system describing the model7. But 
what Walras is willing to assume in the first passage, he is no longer prepared 
to grant in the second: for in the latter, at least in our opinion, Walras betrays 
his deepest conviction that, in almost all cases, the theorist cannot obtain the 
necessary quantitative information about the data and conditions of the 
model; and, in the last analysis, it is this pessimistic belief that explains why, 
according to Walras, the “theoretical” solution is “absolutely impracticable in 
almost every case”. 
Our interpretation of the reasons underlying the negative conclusion about 
the computability of the “theoretical” solution reached by Walras in the 
passage drawn from the Eléments, is confirmed by the sentences that 
immediately follow the passage concerned: 
Aussi serait-ce faire une objection bien mal fondée que de nous parler de la 
                                                     
is made just for the sake of the discussion, without any pretence to realism. In the first place, a 
number of expressions employed by Walras in his exposition (such as “a priori”, “en principe”, 
“théoriquement”) reveal the purely hypothetical character of the example he is developing. In 
the second place, the situation described by Walras is itself patently artificial and deliberately 
unrealistic: in fact, in the case in point, the relevant data consist in the traders’ dispositions to 
trade, as summarized by their demand functions; this information is then supposedly 
transmitted to the “calculateur” through a sequence of steps which cannot obviously be taken 
as the description of something real. The steps in the sequence are the following: first the 
traders are required to write down their dispositions to trade on appropriate block-notes; then 
they are supposed to hand over their block-notes to agents representing them in the market; 
finally, the agents are required to hand over such block-notes to the “calculateur”. This is 
really too contrived a procedure to be taken as an idealized description of a real-world 
situation. 
7 Walras’s optimism about the “calculateur”’s computing abilities (that is, about his own 
and his fellow economists’ computing skills), though tempered with caution, is all the same 
unjustified: for, at least in Walras’s times, no economic theorist assumedly possessing all the 
required information about the data of a moderately complex general equilibrium model would 
have been able to numerically solve the equation system describing the model concerned, 
however long the time granted for that computation. Certainly Walras himself would not have 
been able to accomplish such feat: for the only solution algorithm he indirectly proves to be 
somehow acquainted with resembles “an iterative method for solving systems of equations 
which is known as the Gauss-Seidel method in numerical analysis” (Uzawa, 1960, p. 186, fn. 
1); but, as Arrow and Hahn (1971, pp. 305-306) do not fail to point out, such an algorithm is 
not particularly efficient. Moreover, it should be stressed that Walras does not clearly connect 
his own iterative method for solving equation systems with the computability issue, which is 
one of the issues related with the so-called “theoretical” solution, but rather, as we shall see in 
the next subsection (fn. 9), with the question of the empirical discovery of the “practical” 
solution by the competitive market mechanism. 
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difficulté d’établir les courbes d’échange ou leurs équations. L’avantage qu’il 
pourrait y avoir, dans certains cas, à dresser, en totalité ou en partie, la courbe 
de demande ou d’offre d’une marchandise déterminée, et la possibilité ou 
l’impossibilité de le faire, est une question que nous réservons toute entière. 
Pour le moment, nous étudions le problème de l’échange en général, et la 
conception pure et simple des courbes d’échange nous est à la fois suffisante et 
indispensable. (Walras, 1988, p. 93) 
Here Walras implicitly reaffirms a fundamental methodological 
prescription by which mathematical economics ought to abide: namely, he 
suggests that the purpose of the mathematization of the theory is not so much 
to allow the theorist to precisely draw curves nor to compute numerical 
values of the unknown variables, a purpose on the very feasibility of which 
all judgement should be suspended; rather its purpose is to clarify the 
conceptual system to be employed by the theorist, thereby making rigorous 
analysis possible. 
In the above statements one can easily find many a trace of Cournot’s 
conception of the role of mathematical analysis in the development of 
theoretical economics, as expressed, in particular, in the Preface to his 1838 
book: 
J’ai dit que les auteurs spéciaux dans ces matières semblent d’ailleurs s’être 
fait une idée fausse de la nature des applications de l’analyse mathématique à 
la théorie des richesses. On s’est figuré que l’emploi des signes et des formules 
ne pouvait avoir d’autre but que celui de conduire à des calculs numériques 
[…]. Mais les personnes versées dans l’analyse mathématique savent qu’elle 
n’a pas seulement pour objet de calculer des nombres ; qu’elle est aussi 
employée à trouver des relations entre des grandeurs que l’on ne peut évaluer 
numériquement, entre des fonctions dont la loi n’est pas susceptible de 
s’exprimer par des symboles algébriques. (Cournot, 1838, pp. VII-VIII) 
Though occasionally acknowledging his debt towards Cournot, Walras is 
always very careful to circumscribe the role played by his predecessor in the 
development of his own system of thought. For instance, in his first mémoire, 
after praising Cournot for his path-breaking contribution to the 
mathematization of economics, Walras immediately adds that “[…] nos 
recherches ne se confondent point et je crois pouvoir dire que je ne lui ai 
emprunté que sa méthode”, where by method he simply means “l’application 
des mathématiques à l’économie politique” (Walras, 1874, p. 29; see also 
1988, p. 5, 4). Among the many reasons that might explain Walras’s 
minimizing attitude towards Cournot’s theoretical contribution, one is 
perhaps suggested by a remark contained in a letter that the former sends to 
the latter in March 1874: 
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Notre méthode est la même, car la mienne est la vôtre, seulement, vous vous 
placez immédiatement au bénéfice de la loi des grands nombres et sur le 
chemin qui mène aux applications numériques. Et moi je demeure en deçà de 
cette loi sur le terrain des données rigoureuses et de la pure théorie. (Walras in 
Antonelli, 1935, p. 123) 
Here Walras is contrasting his own theoretical orientation towards general, 
multi-market analysis with Cournot’s orientation towards partial, single-
market analysis, also in view of possible numerical applications; but, almost 
certainly, he is also critically commenting upon the fact that Cournot, in his 
Recherches, while refraining from taking the individual data of the exchange 
problem (that is, individual utility functions and endowments) as the starting 
point for the construction of market demand functions, occasionally endorses 
the idea that the “law of demand” might be obtained by means of “empirical” 
or “statistical” procedures, possibly leading to “numerical applications” 
(Cournot, 1838, pp. 47-50). The point made by Walras in this letter is 
interesting, because he makes it clear that, for the purposes of “pure theory”, 
only individual data can be regarded as “rigorous”. Moreover, according to 
Walras, the obvious difficulties encountered by the theorist in collecting and 
processing such data ought not to be circumvented, as Cournot allegedly 
suggests, by resorting to statistical procedures aimed at the attainment of 
numerical results. 
In view of these last remarks, our discussion of Walras’s overall position 
towards the computability issue may be summarized as follows: in spite of a 
few oscillations and possibly misleading statements, Walras keeps 
substantially faithful to the idea that, due to the individual and dispersed 
nature of the data characterizing most economic problems, no real knowledge 
of the data can be obtained in almost every case, so that, for this very reason, 
the computability question should be answered in the negative. 
On the other hand, the recognition that the “theoretical” solution of a given 
model is almost never computable by the theorist by no means lessens either 
the role played by the theory or its empirical content. The latter, in particular, 
is always assured by the fact that, in Walras’s view, the concrete 
determination of the solution, or the effective establishment of the 
equilibrium of the model under question, is the outcome of the empirical 
procedure implemented by the competitive market mechanism. In other 
words, whether the “theoretical” solution is computable or not becomes a 
question of minor interest, as soon as one is ready to admit that, from a 
“practical” or “empirical” point of view, it is the market to solve the model 
or, better, the problem the model describes, by approaching and eventually 
discovering the so-called “practical” solution. 
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2.3. The “practical” solution. - This last remark brings us back to the second 
requirement that, according to Walras, must be met in order that a model 
expressed in equational form may be regarded as properly solved. The 
discussion of both the second requirement and the associated “practical” 
solution concept permeates all of Walras’s theoretical work. Yet, in spite of 
the relentless efforts Walras devotes to improving this part of his theory, a 
part which is also quantitatively very relevant, he never succeeds in fully 
understanding and, a fortiori, adequately formalizing the theoretical 
implications of his own methodological premises. 
Once again, for the sake of simplicity, and following Walras’s own lead, 
let us assume that, for any given equilibrium model, the “theoretical” solution 
exists and is unique. Then, in order to satisfy Walras’s second requirement, 
the theorist ought to proceed as follows. In the first place he should 
supplement the system of ordinary algebraic equations describing the 
equilibrium model under question with a system of functional equations, 
whose purpose is to reproduce or mimic the adjustment processes by means 
of which the mechanism of competition empirically solves the problem 
described by the model concerned. According to Walras, in order to mimic 
the real-world adjustment processes, the dynamical process governed by the 
adjoined system of functional equations ought to depend on upward or 
downward movements of suitably specified state variables, reacting to 
specified disequilibrium gauges: in the exchange model the state variables are 
the prices of the traded commodities, reacting to the excess demands 
prevailing in the corresponding markets; in the production models the state 
variables are the amounts of the produced commodities, reacting to the 
profits accruing to the corresponding producers. Of course, in order to 
achieve the stated goal, two further conditions ought to be satisfied: in the 
first place, the dynamical process described by the adjoined system of 
functional equations should converge to a stationary solution, which could 
then be viewed as the “practical” solution approached by the market; and, in 
the second place, such stationary solution should coincide with the 
“theoretical” solution, that is, with the mathematical solution of the system of 
ordinary equations underlying the equilibrium model concerned. 
Walras does not evade the tasks that his own methodological prescriptions 
impose on his research agenda. In effect, for each of his four equilibrium 
models, he endeavors first of all to construct a specific system of functional 
(in point of fact, difference) equations, that he interprets as an idealized 
representation of the competitive adjustment mechanism which operates “par 
tâtonnement” (Walras,1988, p. 400, 1; p. 308, 376, 398, 401, 2-3; pp. 189, 
388-390, 2-4; pp. 326-328, 379, 387; p. 698, 3-4; p. 309, 399, 441, 463, 465, 
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4). The label “tâtonnement”, that will later come to be commonly used in the 
literature to designate both the adjustment mechanism originally devised by 
Walras and some of its variants or offspring, draws its origin precisely from 
the expression employed by Walras to allude to the fact that the competitive 
adjustment mechanism can only proceed by trial and error. With respect to 
terminological matters, it should also be noted that, while Walras’s theory of 
the competitive adjustment mechanism has certainly to do with what any 
contemporary mathematical economist would describe as a dynamical system 
or process, Walras himself never uses the word “dynamics” or “dynamical” 
to refer to this part of his theoretical system; the reason for this will become 
clear in a moment. In the second place, and once again for each of his four 
equilibrium models, Walras tries to show not only that the dynamical process 
converges to a stationary solution, interpreted as the “practical” solution 
empirically arrived at by the market, but also that such “practical” solution 
invariably coincides with the “theoretical” one (Walras, 1988, pp. 93, 307, 
375; p. 189, 2-4; p. 461, 4)8. 
However, as far as the dynamical part of his theory (in the modern sense of 
the word) is concerned, Walras’s mathematical skills prove to be even poorer 
than those he had displayed in both the construction of his equilibrium 
models and the examination of the associated systems of ordinary equations. 
In effect, in none of his many separate discussions of the tâtonnement 
construct, one for each equilibrium model, Walras succeeds in formalizing 
the adjustment process by means of a reasonably complete and formally 
acceptable system of difference equations; a fortiori, he never really succeeds 
in proving that the dynamic process does actually converge to a stationary 
solution9. On the basis of a few heuristic attempts at proving convergence, in 
                                                     
8 A detailed examination of the relations existing between equilibrium and tâtonnement in 
Walras’s theoretical writings, and especially in the Eléments, can be found in Donzelli (2005). 
9 Walras is intimately convinced that, in the real-world markets of a multi-commodity 
economy, the actual functioning of the mechanism of competition entails a simultaneous 
adjustment of all the relevant state variables: e.g,, if a real-world exchange economy were out 
of equilibrium, the competitive market mechanism would cause, according to Walras, a 
simultaneous change in the prices of all the traded commodities in the appropriate directions. 
The formalization of such a “simultaneous” tâtonnement process, however, would require the 
use of mathematical methods, based on vector analysis and multivariate calculus, which are 
well beyond Walras’s capabilities. Essentially for this reason Walras is unwillingly forced to 
contrive a market-by-market adjustment process, where the state variables are sequentially 
adjusted one at a time; though admittedly unrealistic, such a “successive” tâtonnement process 
is preferred by Walras to the “simultaneous” one, since, unlike the latter, it can at least be 
described, though certainly not solved, by means of scalar methods not unfamiliar to him (see 
Walras’s letter to the Italian economist Maffeo Pantaleoni, dated September 2, 1889, published 
in Jaffé (1965, Vol. II, pp. 343-347); see also Uzawa (1960)). It is in this context, and for these 
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the first edition of the Eléments Walras feels entitled to state that, in each 
case, the dynamic process “certainly” converges to a stationary solution, 
which also coincides with the “theoretical” solution of the corresponding 
equilibrium model. Yet, in a private letter written in 1884, Wicksteed 
develops a counter-example which forces Walras to recognize that, at least in 
one case, his alleged convergence “proof” is false10. As a consequence, 
Walras is unwillingly led to mitigate his initial claims about the convergence 
of the tâtonnement process, by replacing the expression “certain 
convergence” of the first edition with the less compromising expression 
“probable convergence” in all the subsequent editions of the Eléments 
(Walras, 1988, pp. 195, 326, 328, 2-4; p. 698, 3-4). 
But the alleged and never proved convergence of the dynamic process to a 
stationary solution is not the only questionable statement made by Walras 
about the properties of the tâtonnement construct: as a matter of fact, also his 
reiterated claim that the “practical” solution identically coincides with the 
“theoretical” one is not beyond dispute.  
Walras is fully aware of the relevance of this claim for his own theory: for, 
since the “theoretical” solution of any equilibrium model is almost never 
computable, the practical significance of any such solution, hence the 
empirical content of the model concerned and, ultimately, of the entire 
Walrasian theory, come to depend, according to Walras, on the competitive 
market mechanism being capable, in each concrete case, of automatically 
driving the economy under question to an equilibrium state that coincides 
with the “theoretical” solution. Walras is also aware that one necessary, 
though certainly not sufficient, condition for the claim to hold true is that, 
during the tâtonnement process, the data of the model should not change: the 
assumption of data invariance over the entire adjustment process becomes 
therefore one of the distinguishing features of the Walrasian tâtonnement 
construct. 
This is also the reason why Walras consistently refrains from using the 
word “dynamics” or any of its derivatives to qualify what, to modern eyes, 
would undoubtedly appear as a dynamical process. The fact is that, for 
Walras, “dynamics” is that part of economic theory which has to do with the 
effects of changes in the data, while “statics” is that part of economic theory 
which studies the properties of an equilibrium state (or, what is the same, the 
properties of a “theoretical” solution), given a certain set of data and 
                                                     
reasons, that Walras develops that peculiar iterative method for solving systems of equations, 
resembling the Gauss-Siedel algorithm, on which we dwelled before. 
10 Wicksteed’s letter and Walras’s reply are published in Jaffé (1965, Vol. II, pp. 16-18 and 
24-26). 
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independently of the process through which the equilibrium (or the solution) 
comes to be established (Walras, 1988, p. 146; p. 308, 2-3; pp. 107, 309, 351, 
377, 430, 447, 4). Now, since, by assumption, the data must remain 
unchanged during the tâtonnement process, the tâtonnement itself cannot be 
regarded as belonging to the sphere of “dynamics”: rather, it should be 
viewed as a sort of appendix to “statics”, since in any specific case the data of 
the tâtonnement are the same as the data of the corresponding “statical” 
model. 
By coming across Bertrand’s critical review (Bertrand, 1883, pp. 199-202) 
of his Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale, a collection of essays 
including his first four mémoires (Walras, 1883), and by perusing, a few 
years later, Edgeworth’s critical remarks specifically directed at his theory of 
the tâtonnement (Edgeworth, 1889, p. 268, and 1891, p. 370), Walras 
undoubtedly realizes that there exist legitimate interpretations of “statics” and 
“dynamics” which significantly differ from his own or, what is the same, 
from Bortkiewicz’s (1890, pp. 358-359), who, in his reply to Edgeworth’s 
original attack, simply voices Walras’s own ideas; and probably he also 
realizes that the entire tâtonnement construct is not free from logical, 
epistemological, as well as analytical difficulties. Yet, apart from an explicit 
recognition that “ces mots statique et dynamique sont dangereux”11, this 
awareness does not induce Walras to alter either the formal structure of his 
theory or his conceptual apparatus; what really changes over the years is the 
interpretation of the tâtonnement process, in a way that we now intend to 
elucidate. 
As already mentioned, the assumption of data invariance during the 
adjustment process is a fundamental and invariant pillar of Walras’s theory of 
the tâtonnement over all his active scientific life: no change takes place in 
this respect from the publication of the first mémoire (1874) to the 
appearance of the fourth edition of the Eléments (1900). What instead 
dramatically changes over that time span is Walras’s understanding of the 
constraints that such assumption imposes upon the adjustment processes that 
the theorist is allowed to contemplate and use for the purposes of the 
analysis. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of his scientific itinerary 
Walras is convinced that the tâtonnement construct ought to be so devised as 
to realistically describe how an equilibrium state comes to be established 
through an adjustment process taking place in “real” time, that is, over a time 
                                                     
11 This statement can be found in a mémoire attached to a letter that Walras sends to Pareto 
in 1895 (Jaffé, 1965, vol. II, p. 630). A draft of the mémoire, however, had probably been 
written a few years before, at the end of the controversy between Edgeworth and Bortkiewicz 
(Edgeworth, 1891). 
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set which is the same as that over which the economy concerned is supposed 
to evolve; moreover, the adjustment process ought to be such that not only in 
equilibrium, but also out of equilibrium, the individual participants in the 
economy are allowed to carry out observable behavior, which in turn may 
affect the evolution of the economy in an essential way. That this is the pre-
analytic vision of the tâtonnement process guiding Walras in his initial 
discussion of this construct at the very start of his research activity can be 
easily inferred from the celebrated informal illustrations of the functioning of 
a corn market and a security market that are respectively placed before the 
formal expositions of the exchange equilibrium model in the 1874 mémoire 
(Walras, 1874, pp. 31-32) and in the first installment of the first edition of the 
Eléments (Walras, 1988, pp. 71-72)12. Moreover, the formal discussion of the 
tâtonnement process in production, as developed in the second installment of 
the first edition of the Eléments (1877), as well as in the second (1889) and 
third (1896) editions of the same book, cannot but confirm that, at least in the 
case of production, Walras originally conceives and formally represents the 
tâtonnement process in a very realistic way, as an observable disequilibrium 
process in “real” time; such conception will then persist, with only minor 
modifications leaving the essential aspects unchanged, for more than twenty 
years13. 
Yet, this realistic conception of the tâtonnement process is inconsistent 
with Walras’s own premises and assumptions: in the first place, Walras is 
unable to provide any detailed theory of observable disequilibrium behavior 
which is compatible with the theory of individual choice underlying his 
version of GET, so that it proves impossible, within the Walrasian 
framework, to theoretically describe, let alone predict, the path followed by 
the economy under a hypothetical process of adjustment allowing for 
observable disequilibrium behavior; in the second place, even granting, for 
the discussion’s sake, that any such observable disequilibrium theory could 
somehow be concocted, the occurrence of observable disequilibrium behavior 
would in general disrupt the assumption of data invariance over the 
tâtonnement process: only few special cases, concerning artificially 
                                                     
12  As regards the latter illustration, in order to appreciate Walras’s original viewpoint as 
expressed in 1874, one should disregard the short sentences inserted here and there into the 
text since the second edition of the Eléments, for the aim of such sentences is precisely to 
change the interpretation of the tâtonnement process in a less realistic direction (see footnote 
14 below). 
13 See Walras (1988, pp. 308, 310-330, 1 and 2-3). Since in this part of the Eléments the 
texts of the various editions are strictly interwoven, the various versions of the tâtonnement in 
production can only be identified by means of a careful perusal, almost line by line, of the 
relevant pages. 
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constructed economies, could escape this fate. 
After Bertrand’s critique, which is specifically directed at the exchange 
model, Walras realizes that his original realistic interpretation of the 
tâtonnement in exchange must be abandoned: hence, since the second edition 
of the Eléments, he explicitly introduces a “no trade out of equilibrium” 
assumption which, by ruling out all sorts of observable disequilibrium 
behavior in the exchange model, turns the corresponding tâtonnement process 
into a purely virtual process, where nothing observable can occur14. Such 
virtual process evolves over a “logical” time entirely disconnected from the 
“real” time over which the economy is supposed to evolve. Hence, since it 
takes just one instant of “real” time for the adjustment process to carry its 
effects through, the equilibrium state, granting that it is eventually reached, 
must be imagined as “instantaneously” arrived at, as far as the “real” time of 
the economy is concerned (Walras, 1885, p. 312, fn. 1). 
As to the production and capital formation models discussed in the various 
editions of the Eléments, however, a sort of generalized “no trade out of 
equilibrium” assumption is only introduced in the fourth edition of the 
Eléments, published in 1900, when Walras eventually resolves to adopt the 
so-called “hypothèse des bons”: according to this assumption, no trader 
(consumer, producer, or owner of the factors of production) is allowed to 
carry out any actual transaction until an equilibrium is arrived at; until then, 
all traders can only exchange “bons”, that is, conditional claims, which are 
not effective whenever the economy is out of equilibrium (Walras, 1988, pp. 
309, 377, 447, 4). With the adoption of the “hypothèse des bons”, all sorts of 
tâtonnement processes, not only in exchange, but also in production, are 
eventually turned into purely virtual processes, taking place in a “logical” 
time which is disconnected from the “real” time of the economy; hence, since 
the fourth edition of the Eléments, the last published in Walras’s lifetime, in 
all the equilibrium models the equilibrium state, granting that it is actually 
reached, must be supposed to be “instantaneously” arrived at, as far as the 
“real” time of the economy is concerned. 
It is not difficult, at this point, to explain why Walras so strenuously resists 
the adoption of the “no trade out of equilibrium” assumption and, especially, 
of its generalization, the “hypothèse des bons”, which is in effect introduced 
more than a quarter of a century after the initial exposition of the Walrasian 
                                                     
14 See the few sentences to this effect added to the security illustration preceding the formal 
exposition of the theory of exchange in the Eléments (Walras, 1988, pp. 71-72, 2-4). A few 
years before a “no trade out of equilibrium” assumption had already been introduced in Walras 
(1885, p. 312, fn. 1). A similar statement can also be found in Walras’s mémoire mentioned in 
footnote 11 above (see Jaffé, 1965, vol. II, p. 630). 
 WALRAS AND PARETO ON THE SOLUTION CONCEPT  509 
version of GET. By turning the equilibration process into a purely virtual 
process in “logical” time, and consequently by revealing the “instantaneous” 
character (in “real” time) of the equilibrium concept employed by the theory, 
the “no trade out of equilibrium” assumption and, a fortiori, the “hypothèse 
des bons” deprive the tâtonnement construct of most of its realistic flavor. 
For Walras, as we have seen, the essential purpose of the tâtonnement would 
be to show how the competitive market mechanism approaches and 
discovers, by trial and error, the “practical” solution of a given model; this 
would confer an empirical content first of all to the “practical” solution itself, 
and then, assuming identity between “practical” and “theoretical” solution, to 
the latter as well. But it is really difficult to accept that an “instantaneous” 
process, over which nothing observable can actually occur, can be taken to 
mimic the functioning of real-world markets. So that, in the end, Walras’s 
elaborate construction, based on the distinction between “theoretical” and 
“practical” solution, on the one hand, and the connection between the two 
solutions via the tâtonnement construct, on the other, proves inadequate to 
satisfy its stated purpose. 
3. Pareto’s Perspective 
As is well-known, Pareto’s views about the meaning of the equilibrium 
concept and, more generally, about the scope and significance of GET 
undergo deep changes over the period ranging from the appearance of his 
first comprehensive economic treatise, the Cours d’économie politique, 
published in two volumes in 1896 and 1897, respectively, and the drafting of 
his more mature and innovative book in theoretical economics, first published 
in Italian in 1906, under the title Manuale di economia politica, and then 
again in 1909, in a greatly revised French edition, under the title Manuel 
d’économie politique15. 
The evolution of Pareto’s ideas over the turn of the century is partly due to 
his pursuing, sometimes unconsciously, two different aims: in the first place, 
Pareto strives to detach himself from the influence of Walras’s original 
conception of GET, which in effect can be strongly felt in the Cours, the 
most explicitly Walrasian of all Pareto’s writings in theoretical economics, 
but becomes much weaker in the Manuale, and even more so in the Manuel; 
                                                     
15 Quite recently a critical edition of the Manuale (Pareto, 1906) has been published, which 
also contains the Italian translation of all the passages appearing in the Manuel, but not in the 
Manuale, as well as the entire mathematical appendix of the Manuel, which significantly 
differs from that of the Manuale. 
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in the second place, Pareto also engages in a struggle of escape from the 
shackles of his own strictly positivistic and empiricist creed, which, after 
powerfully affecting his own research activity and theoretical conception in 
the 1890s, apparently loses some of its strength in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. 
The general evolution of Pareto’s theoretical and methodological stance in 
the crucial period going from the publication of the Cours to the appearance 
of the Manuel cannot but influence also his views concerning Walras’s 
peculiar conception of the meaning and role of the solution concept in 
general equilibrium models. This is what we are going to discuss in the 
following subsection. 
3.1. Pareto on Walras’s twofold solution concept. - At the origin of the 
different positions taken by Walras and Pareto on the interpretation of the 
solution concept in GET there are their divergent attitudes towards the 
significance of the tâtonnement construct. As we have seen, in fact, in all the 
many editions of the Eléments Walras devotes much effort and a huge 
number of pages to the discussion of the tâtonnement processes associated 
with his equilibrium models. Nothing similar can be said of Pareto: for, after 
downsizing the discussion of the tâtonnement construct to a few lines in the 
Cours, he completely forgets the very existence of that construct in both the 
Manuale and the Manuel. As a consequence, barring one single exception, to 
which we shall come back later, the very idea of a “practical” solution, 
playing such a central role in Walras’s theoretical system, simply disappears 
from Pareto’s reflections and writings. 
In the Cours, where, as already recalled, Pareto is still under the spell of 
Walras’s conception of GET, the tâtonnement construct, nowhere mentioned 
under that name, is briefly discussed in three different places, where Pareto 
summarizes the equilibrium equations underlying Walras’s original models 
of exchange, production, and capital formation, respectively. In particular, 
with reference to the exchange model, Pareto’s discussion of the dynamical 
adjustment process boils down to the following few lines: 
Mr Walras a fait voir que le marchandage qui s’établit avec la libre 
concurrence est le moyen de résoudre par tentatives les équations de l’échange. 
Mr Edgeworth a objecté que ce n’était là qu’un moyen. Il a raison; mais le 
moyen indiqué par Mr Walras est bien celui qui représente la partie principale 
du phénomène économique. (Pareto, 1896, p. 25) 
With the above statements Pareto marginally enters the already mentioned 
controversy between Edgeworth and Bortkiewicz about the significance of 
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Walras’s theory of the tâtonnement. However, in 1896, when Pareto 
eventually enters the arena, the controversy has already been over for a long 
time16. In the Cours Pareto naturally sides with Walras and Bortkiewicz, but 
his defense of the tâtonnement construct is weak and weary: for he simply 
repeats, almost word by word, Bortkiewicz’s argument, which had evidently 
become the official line of defense of the small Walrasian circle. 
With reference to the production model, Pareto (1896, p. 47) concisely 
describes, in a purely informal way, Walras’s assumptions concerning the 
adjustment process in production. Finally, with reference to the model of 
capital formation, after informally summarizing in a few lines Walras’s 
labored description of the relevant  tâtonnement process, Pareto appends the 
following footnote to the text: 
Il faudrait démontrer que, par ces divers ajustements, on se rapproche 
toujours plus de l’équilibre. […] Nous ne développerons pas cette 
démonstration, qui serait inutile aux personnes qui ignorent les mathématiques, 
et qui sera trouvée facilement par les personnes connaissant la théorie générale 
des équations. (Pareto, 1896, p. 61, fn. 2) 
As we have seen above, however, it is all but easy to prove the 
convergence to equilibrium of the tâtonnement process associated with the 
model of capital formation, as Pareto ought very well to have known since, 
unlike Walras, he is perfectly familiar with the theory of dynamic equations: 
indeed, should one strictly keep to Walras’s original formulation of the 
tâtonnement process associated with the capital formation model, as Pareto 
apparently intends to suggest in the text to which the above footnote is 
appended, the proof would be altogether impossible, since that formulation is 
inconsistent. Hence, the arguments produced by Pareto for omitting to prove 
the alleged convergence property of the Walrasian tâtonnement process are 
hardly credible. One might perhaps think that this omission be due to the 
introductory text-book character of the Cours, which would make the use of 
some relatively difficult mathematics inappropriate (all mathematical 
formulae are in effect confined to footnotes). But why then does Pareto 
completely skip this topic in the appendices of both the Manuale and the 
Manuel, which are specifically devoted to the examination of thorny 
mathematical issues? Why does Pareto suppress any reference, even an 
indirect one,  to the tâtonnement, as soon as he succeeds in freeing himself 
from the cumbersome Walrasian legacy, as he is eventually able to do in the 
Manuale and the Manuel? 
                                                     
16 Many years later Edgeworth (1925, Vol. II, p. 311) will briefly come back to the same 
issue, reiterating his ancient criticism. 
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To answer these questions becomes necessarily a speculative exercise: for, 
since we cannot accept Pareto’s own justifications for his modeling choices 
or omissions, we are forced to propose an alternative reading of his 
unfavorable attitude, growing clearer and clearer as time elapses, towards the 
tâtonnement construct. The first explanation of Pareto’s substantial neglect of 
the Walrasian construct might be exactly the opposite of what he seems to 
suggest in the Cours: precisely, Pareto would not even try to formalize 
Walras’s tâtonnement process by means of a system of functional (difference 
or differential) equations, let alone to prove any of its alleged properties, not 
because such formalization or proof would be too easy or even trivial, but 
rather because he perfectly knows, being well acquainted with the use of 
differential equations in rational mechanics, that any such formalization or 
proof would be exceedingly difficult or even impossible, under Walras’s 
assumptions.  
Apart from these analytical difficulties, however, there almost certainly 
exists also a conceptual obstacle which keeps Pareto from endorsing Walras’s 
approach to the analysis of the equilibration processes. As we have seen 
above, Walras’s tâtonnement construct occupies a very peculiar, half-way 
position in the Walrasian conceptual system: for, while any proper 
formalization of the construct would turn the tâtonnement process into an 
ordinary dynamical process (in the modern sense of the word), Walras tends 
instead to view it as an appendix to the “statical” part of his theory, due to the 
underlying assumption of data invariance, which is, in his view, the hallmark 
of “statics”. The tâtonnement construct, therefore, might be regarded as 
Walras’s original attempt at dynamizing (in the modern sense of the word) 
the equilibrium concept, without calling into question, however, the “statical” 
nature of the latter. But, as already explained, contrary to Walras’s 
expectations, this attempt at dynamizing the “statical” equilibrium concept is 
either theoretically inconsistent or empirically irrelevant. 
This dilemma, whose very existence Walras tries to deny till the end of his 
life, is almost certainly perceived by Pareto from the beginning of his 
scientific career. Starting from his superior knowledge of classical 
mechanics, Pareto immediately realizes that the static equilibrium notion, as 
employed in GET, is essentially different from the static equilibrium notion 
of classical mechanics (of course, we are referring to methodological and 
analytical, rather than substantive, differences, since the latter would 
certainly be unsurprising). In particular, while in mechanics a static 
equilibrium is itself defined by a system of dynamic (that is, functional) 
equations, so that a smooth transition from statics (or equilibrium analysis) to 
dynamics is always possible, in economics, instead, a static equilibrium, in 
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the sense of Walras’s “theoretical” solution, is essentially defined by a 
system of ordinary, rather than functional, equations, so that no easy 
transition from statics (or equilibrium analysis) to dynamics is available in 
this case, as the disappointing outcome of the Walrasian tâtonnement story 
amply testifies. 
Pareto’s early awareness of the existence of this sort of difficulties, if not 
of their possible solution, is clearly witnessed by the following passage: 
En mécanique, le principe de d’Alembert nous permet d’étudier, d’une 
manière complète, l’état dynamique d’un système. Nous ne faisons encore, en 
Economie politique, qu’entrevoir un principe analogue. En science sociale, 
cette vague lueur même fait défaut. Dans la première comme dans la seconde 
de ces sciences, nous sommes obligés de substituer à la considération de 
l’équilibre dynamique la considération d’une série d’équilibres statiques. 
(Pareto, 1897, pp. 9-10) 
In the fifteen years following the publication of the Cours Pareto tries hard 
to discover an economic analogue of the so-called d’Alembert principle in 
classical mechanics, an analogue which, if discovered, would allow the 
economist to smoothly switch from economic statics to economic dynamics, 
and viceversa, as the d’Alembert principle allows the physicist to do in 
classical mechanics. But his quest proves completely unsuccessful and is 
eventually abandoned as a dangerous detour17. 
This negative outcome, on the other hand, could have been easily 
predicted, since it is simply due to the peculiar nature of economic 
equilibrium, as employed in GET, which is not amenable to the kind of 
analysis characteristic of classical mechanics. As Pareto already perceives in 
writing the Cours, an economic equilibrium, unlike a mechanical one, is an 
instantaneous equilibrium, supposedly describing the state of economy at a 
specified instant of time. Supposing time to be interpreted as a discrete 
variable, so that the economy evolves over an infinite sequence of unit time 
periods or dates, any such economic equilibrium must be supposed to be 
instantaneously reached at the initial instant of the corresponding date; since 
the equilibria typically vary over time, the evolution of the economy can only 
be described by means of a chronologically ordered sequence of such 
instantaneous equilibria, which typically differ from one another. This view 
of both the concept of economic equilibrium and the method that economic 
theory must employ to describe the evolution of the economy over time is 
also expressed by Pareto by means of a well-known metaphor, which is 
developed in the paragraph immediately following the passage of the Cours 
                                                     
17 This aspect of Pareto’s research program is discussed in detail in Donzelli (1997). 
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quoted above: 
Pour donner une idée assez grossière, mais expressive de la chose, 
supposons qu’un homme qui est dans un traîneau, glisse sur une pente. Un 
autre homme descend à pied la même pente, en s’arrêtant à chaque pas. Les 
deux hommes partent en même temps du sommet, voyagent constamment en 
compagnie, et arrivent en même temps en bas de la pente. En gros, leur 
mouvement est donc à peu près le même. Mais le mouvement de l’homme qui 
est dans le traîneau, est un mouvement continu, son étude constitue un 
problème de dynamique. Le mouvement de l’homme descendant à pied, 
représente une suite de positions successives d’équilibre. Il passe de l’une à 
l’autre, d’une manière discontinue. C’est précisément une suite semblable de 
positions d’équilibre que nous pouvons étudier en économie politique. (Pareto, 
1987, p. 10, par. 587) 
As can be seen from this passage, Pareto’s understanding of the reasons 
why economics (or, better, GET), unlike mechanics, is unable to develop a 
fully-fledged dynamic theory of the evolution of the systems it studies is still 
relatively vague, but his intuition of the necessarily instantaneous nature of 
the economic equilibrium concept is very precise. After many years of 
unsuccessful attempts at overcoming the limitations of economics, as 
illustrated in the Cours, the instantaneous interpretation of the notion of 
economic equilibrium will eventually be reconfirmed by Pareto in both the 
Manuale (2006, pp. 108-109, 240) and the Manuel (1909, pp. 147-148, 337-
338)), where the pseudo-dynamic method of analysis based on the study of “a 
sequence of successive equilibrium positions” will also be re-proposed as the 
characteristic method of economics. 
As it should be clear by now, Pareto’s instantaneous interpretation of the 
economic equilibrium concept basically corresponds to the interpretation 
eventually endorsed by Walras towards the end of his active scientific life, at 
the time of the publication of the fourth edition of the Eléments (1900). 
Unlike Walras, however, Pareto arrives at similar conclusions at the very 
beginning of the most creative period of his life as an economic theorist. This 
fact may concur to explain Pareto’s limited interest in the tâtonnement 
construct: for when an equilibrium state is regarded as instantaneously 
reached, the equilibration process must necessarily be interpreted as a purely 
virtual process in “logical” time; but then the analysis of such a process can 
contribute very little, or nothing at all, to either supporting the statical 
equilibrium concept or strengthening the empirical content of equilibrium 
theory, so that its very raison d’être tends to fade away. 
With the substantial disappearance of the tâtonnement construct from 
Pareto’s theoretical framework, also the Walrasian notion of “practical” 
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solution, which is intimately connected with the analysis of the equilibration 
process, goes out of the picture, leaving almost no trace behind. Of the two 
solution concepts originally introduced and systematically employed by 
Walras, therefore, only the “theoretical” solution survives. But since it is no 
longer necessary to distinguish such solution concept from the “practical” 
one, the very concept of solution becomes superfluous: so that, in the end, 
what Walras had called the “theoretical” solution of a given model, is simply 
referred to by Pareto as the equilibrium of that model.  
3.2. Pareto on equilibrium determinateness and computability. - The 
questions of existence, uniqueness and computability, which had been 
discussed by Walras with reference to his concept of “theoretical” solution, 
arise once again within Pareto’s conceptual framework, with reference to the 
latter’s notion of static equilibrium. 
As far as the questions of equilibrium existence and uniqueness are 
concerned, Pareto’s progress with respect to Walras is not really significant. 
In discussing the issue of equilibrium determinateness, equation-counting is 
the only criterion that is explicitly mentioned by Pareto not only in the Cours, 
what is only natural (Pareto, 1896, pp. 24-26, fn. 1, pp. 44-46, fn. 1, pp. 59-
61, fn. 1), but also in the much more mature mathematical appendix of the 
Manuel (Pareto, 1909, p. 665). On the other hand, the reasons explaining 
such inadequate development of the analysis are the same for Pareto as they 
were for Walras, so that it is unnecessary to dwell upon them once again. 
The issue of equilibrium computability, instead, raises new and interesting 
problems in Pareto’s case, which deserve careful examination. The most 
relevant aspect, in this regard, is that Pareto’s view of the equilibrium 
computability issue, as well as his interpretation of GET, significantly change 
over the years, reflecting a corresponding change in some of the 
methodological premises guiding his theoretical investigations. 
Pareto’s initial position concerning the empirical content and predictive 
power of GET, as well as the related question of the computability of 
economic equilibria, is well expressed by the following passage of the Cours, 
where he compares economics, or more precisely GET, with other sciences or 
theoretical systems, such as astronomy or classical mechanics, regarded by 
most economists and social scientists in Pareto’s times as a model for the 
development of their respective disciplines: 
Considérons, en général, certains phénomènes: A, B, C. Nos connaissances 
sur leur mutuelle dépendance peuvent passer par trois degrés successifs: (α) 
Nous pouvons seulement savoir que cette dépendance existe […] . (β) nous 
pouvons, en outre, avoir une idée des liaisons qui existent entre A, B, C, … 
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[…] . (γ) Enfin, nous pouvons non seulement connaître le sens des ces 
variations, mais encore en calculer exactement la grandeur. Arrivée à ce point, 
notre connaissance de l’ensemble des phénomènes A, B, C, … est complète et 
parfaite.  
L’astronomie, pour les mouvements du système solaire, est arrivée à l’état 
(γ). […] En général, la mécanique nous permet, si les donnés numériques sont 
suffisantes, d’arriver au degré de connaissance (γ), pour un système matériel. A 
défaut de données numériques, elle nous conduit au moins au degré (β). 
L’économie politique, avant la découverte des nouvelles théories, était 
arrêtée au degré (α) […]. Les nouvelles théories ont porté l’économie politique 
au degré (β). Le système complet des équations de l’équilibre économique ne 
met pas seulement en évidence la mutuelle dépendance des phénomènes, il 
nous renseigne encore sur le sens des variations de certaines éléments quand on 
en fait varier d’autres. Il y a plus, ces équations nous font connaître la voie qui, 
quand la statistique sera en mesure de fournir les données numériques 
nécessaires, pourra nous permettre de nous élever au niveau (γ). (Pareto, 1897, 
pp. 5-7) 
What emerges from the above passage is a conception of scientific 
knowledge that reflects a strictly positivistic epistemological background and 
a strongly empiricist methodological approach: according to Pareto, in fact, a 
certain science or theoretical system allows the scientist to achieve a 
“complete” and “perfect” knowledge of the class of phenomena falling under 
its jurisdiction only if it allows the researcher either to “exactly calculate” the 
magnitudes of the variables involved or to make quantitative predictions of 
the changes in such variables ensuing from given changes in the “numerical 
data” of the theory. From this point of view, the “new theories” of “political 
economy”, that is, GET, represent an undisputable progress with respect to 
the older theories, even if they do not yet allow the scientist to reach a 
“complete” and “perfect” knowledge of the economic phenomena. This 
limitation, however, is essentially due to the lack of the “necessary numerical 
data”. As soon as statistics fills this gap, general equilibrium theory, not 
unlike mechanics, can aspire at providing quantitative predictions of the 
values of the relevant (presumably aggregate) economic variables, thereby 
reaching the level of “complete” and “perfect” knowledge. 
The last sentence in the above passage can be read as the proposal of a true 
and proper research program aiming at transforming GET, with the help of 
statistics and econometrics, into a machinery for quantitative predictions. 
Now, as is well-known, Pareto makes great progress over the years in the 
development of statistics and its application to the social sciences. Yet, as far 
as GET is concerned, no single part of the research program outlined in the 
Cours is in effect carried out. On the contrary, both in the Manuale and, in 
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French translation, in the Manuel, we can find a well-known passage, built 
upon a rightly celebrated illustration, which provides an entirely different and 
almost opposite interpretation of GET and its possible uses: 
Les conditions que nous avons énumérées pour l’équilibre économique nous 
donnent une notion générale de cet équilibre. Pour savoir […] ce que c’était 
que l’équilibre économique, nous avons dû rechercher comment il était 
déterminé. Remarquons, d’ailleurs, que cette détermination n’a nullement pour 
but d’arriver à un calcul numérique des prix. Faisons l’hypothèse la plus 
favorable à un tel calcul; supposons que nous ayons triomphé de toutes les 
difficultés pour arriver à connaître les données du problème, et que nous 
connaissions les ophélimités de toutes les marchandises pour chaque individu, 
toutes les circonstances de la production des marchandises, etc. C’est là déjà 
une hypothèse absurde, et pourtant elle ne nous donne pas encore la possibilité 
pratique de résoudre ce problème. Nous avons vu que dans le cas de 100 
individus et de 700 marchandises il y aurait 70.699 conditions (en réalité un 
grand nombre de circonstances, que nous avons jusqu’ici négligées, 
augmenteraient encore ce nombre); nous aurons donc à résoudre un système de 
70.699 équations. Cela dépasse pratiquement la puissance de l’analyse 
algébrique, et cela la dépasserait encore davantage si l’on prenait en 
considération le nombre fabuleux d’équations que donnerait une population de 
quarante millions d’individus, et quelques milliers de marchandises. Dans ce 
cas les rôles seraient changés: et ce ne seraient plus les mathématiques qui 
viendraient en aide à l’économie politique, mais l’économie politique qui 
viendrait en aide aux mathématiques. En d’autres termes, si on pouvait 
vraiment connaître toutes ces équations, le seul moyen accessible aux forces 
humaines pour les résoudre, ce serait d’observer la solution pratique que 
donne le marché. (Pareto, 1909, pp. 233-234; italics added) 
This passage is reminiscent of similar or related statements due to both 
Cournot and Walras. As to Cournot, the following passage, appearing in one 
of the few chapters of the Recherches devoted to the discussion of an “entire 
system” of interrelated markets, certainly represents an important source of 
inspiration for Pareto, as the italicized part testifies: 
Il semble donc que dans la solution complète et rigoureuse des problèmes 
relatifs à quelques parties du système économique, on ne puisse se dispenser 
d’embrasser le système tout entier. Or ceci surpasserait les forces de l’analyse 
mathématique et de nos méthodes pratiques de calcul, quand même toutes les 
valeurs des constantes pourraient être numériquement assignées. (Cournot, 
1838, p. 146) 
In this regard, it may be interesting to notice that Cournot’s 
methodological position about the scope and significance of mathematical 
economics is diversely assessed by the founders of GET. In fact, as we have 
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seen above, Walras reproaches Cournot for his alleged propensity towards the 
employment of “statistical” procedures in view of possible “numerical 
applications” of the theory of demand. On the contrary, we now see that the 
last Pareto, dramatically changing his mind in the Manuel with respect to the 
stance previously taken in the Cours, uses a few words which can certainly 
be traced back to Cournot, even if the latter is not explicitly mentioned, in 
order to support a purely qualitative, non-numerical interpretation of GET18. 
As to Walras, the first point to stress is that the typically Walrasian 
expression “solution pratique” is employed by Pareto only in the quoted 
passage of the Manuel: this expression survives here, in spite of the 
disappearance from the Manuel of any reference to the tâtonnement process,  
because Pareto wants to make it absolutely clear that no “calculateur” can 
possibly replicate what is done in practice by the market. As far as the 
computability of equilibrium is concerned, Pareto is much sharper than 
Walras: first of all, while Walras, in the relevant passage of the 1874 
mémoire, had been ready to grant that, under the assumption of complete 
knowledge of the data, the theorist might be able to calculate the “theoretical” 
solution, Pareto bluntly denies and even ridicules such possibility; in the 
second place, Pareto simply declares that the assumption of complete 
knowledge of the data is “absurd” in itself. 
But then, given that the numerical computation of the equilibrium values 
of the economic variables cannot and must not be the task of GET, what is 
the real significance of this theory? Pareto tentatively answers this question in 
the paragraph immediately following the passage just quoted: 
Mais si les conditions que nous venons d’énumérer ne peuvent pas nous 
servir pratiquement à des calculs numériques de quantité et de prix, elles sont 
l’unique moyen connu jusqu’ici pour arriver à une notion de la façon dont 
varient ces quantités et ces prix, ou, plus exactement, d’une façon générale, 
pour savoir comment se produit l’équilibre économique. (Pareto, 1909, pp. 
234) 
This sort of answer is evidently satisfactory for Pareto, for he refers to it 
many years later, in his Traité de sociologie générale. As a matter of fact, 
Pareto mentions the above paragraphs of the Manuel at the beginning of a 
footnote appended to the following sentence in the text of the Traité: 
L’économie pure arrive à poser les équations de certaines phénomènes, mais 
non à résoudre ces équations, au moins en général. (Pareto, 1917-1919, p. 
                                                     
18 As we shall see in the next subsection, the affinity between Cournot’s statements about 
the scope and limitations of general analysis and Pareto’s statements in the Manuel about the 
scope and limitations of  GET is underlined by Hayek (1942, pp. 290-291).  
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The footnote then proceeds as follows: 
Plusieurs économistes sont tombés dans l’erreur de supposer que les 
théories de l’économie pure pouvaient s’appliquer directement au phénomène 
concret, et Walras croyait pouvoir réformer ainsi la société […]. (Pareto, 1917-
1919, p. 1077, fn. 2) 
These remarks are interesting since they show that, in the eyes of the last 
Pareto, the impossibility of computing the equilibrium values of the 
economic variables is a distinguishing feature of all economic theory. 
Moreover, he associates in his critique two distinct mistakes which evidently 
follow, in his opinion, from the same or similar causes: the wrong pretence to 
numerically solve the economic equilibrium equations, on the one hand, and 
the fallacious idea that GET can be directly applied to the real world or used 
to change it, on the other. Finally, it also deserves notice that, according to 
Pareto, Walras himself is not free from the latter mistake.  
3.3. Pareto’s final interpretation of GET and Hayek’s “explanation of the 
principle”. - As we have seen at the end of the last subsection, in his more 
mature economic and sociological writings, from the Manuale onwards, 
Pareto singles out two erroneous readings of pure economic theory or, more 
specifically, of GET, which are, in his opinion, strictly intertwined: while the 
first mistaken reading of GET is motivated by a misguided pretence to 
“quantitative determinism”, the second is instead inspired by an attitude 
which will be frequently referred to as “social constructivism” in the later 
literature. The link established by the last Pareto between these two 
regulating principles, which he evidently regards as dangerously misleading 
methodological rules, at least as far as their application to the social sciences 
is concerned, is in a sense prophetical, since it anticipates a number of 
important developments characterizing the social sciences over the entire 
twentieth century. 
As regards economic theory specifically, the first and foremost instance of 
a reading of GET which is jointly affected by “quantitative determinism” and 
“social constructivism”, the two questionable regulating principles pinpointed 
by the last Pareto, is represented by an interpretation of GET put forward in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, during the second stage of the so-called 
Socialist Calculation Debate19, by a group of young socialist economists, well 
                                                     
19 A detailed critical reconstruction of the various stages of the Socialist Calculation 
Debate, and specifically of the interpretations proposed, and the uses made, of GET by the 
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conversant with the contemporary developments in general competitive 
equilibrium theory20: according to the position taken by these socialist 
economists, a position which might be referred to as the “first socialist 
interpretation of GET”, the economic calculation and allocation problems 
arising in a centrally planned economy without markets of any sort could be 
solved by directly computing the numerical solution of a system of 
simultaneous equations defining the static equilibrium conditions of a 
suitably specified general competitive equilibrium model of Walrasian 
derivation, supposedly describing the structure of the economy concerned at a 
given date. 
This sort of interpretation of GET cannot but attract the attention of 
Hayek, who has been working since the late 1920s on the meaning of the 
equilibrium concept in economic theory and the significance of the general 
equilibrium approach for the analysis of dynamic phenomena and processes 
in competitive economies. In the mid-1930s Hayek eventually enters the 
Socialist Calculation Debate, which is then well under way, with the explicit 
purpose of criticizing those analyses, underlying the “first socialist 
interpretation of GET”, that are 
directed to show that, on the assumption of a complete knowledge of all 
relevant data, the values and the quantities of the different commodities to be 
produced might be determined by the application of the apparatus by which 
theoretical economics explains the formation of prices and the direction of 
production in a competitive system. (Hayek, 1935, p. 152) 
Against this claim Hayek initially raises the same objections as Pareto had 
already raised in the passage of the Manuel quoted above: namely, he objects 
that, due to the peculiar nature of the data of GET, which are individual, 
subjective, and dispersed among millions of different people, the very 
“assumption of a complete knowledge of all relevant data” is an “absurd 
hypothesis” in itself; further, he objects that, even granting, for the 
discussion’s sake, that the Central Planning Authority could somehow 
acquire that “complete knowledge of all relevant data” that is needed to write 
down a general equilibrium model which can, in principle, be computed, the 
task of actually computing a numerical solution and working out the concrete 
decisions that it implies would be “a task which, with any of the means 
known at present [1935], could not be carried out in a lifetime” (Hayek, 
1935, p. 156). Yet, against the “first socialist interpretation of GET” Hayek 
                                                     
economists taking part in the Debate on both sides of the divide (namely, on both the 
“socialist” and the “market” side), can be found in Donzelli (1993). 
20 See, in particular, Taylor (1929), Roper (1929), and Dickinson (1933). 
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also moves two further criticisms that, though connected with those of 
Paretian derivation, are also partly new and will become, in the course of 
time, a distinctive trait of Hayek’s approach: in the first place, he underlines 
that, while the collection of the relevant data and the computation of the 
numerical equilibrium values of the unknown variables, if at all possible, 
would anyhow necessarily require a huge amount of time, in all real 
economies the data “change from moment to moment”, so that in the end 
what might be collected and conveyed to the authority in charge of the 
computation would never correspond to the actual situation of the economy 
concerned; in the second place, he points out that the insurmountable 
difficulty of collecting all the relevant data and concentrating all the 
knowledge dispersed among the members of the economy into one single 
mind or entity is not only due to practical reasons, but also depends on the 
logical impossibility of inducing the individuals participating in the economy 
to elicit their “tacit” knowledge, that is, that fundamental part of all 
individual knowledge that is not consciously possessed even by those who do 
make use of it (Hayek, 1935, p. 155). 
Given the similarity between most of the objections advanced by Hayek in 
his 1935 essay against the numerical computability of an economic 
equilibrium and the remarks on the same issue originally made by Pareto in 
the Manuel and later writings, it is by no means surprising that Hayek, on 
coming back to the Socialist Calculation Debate after a few years, should 
open his 1940 contribution to that Debate with the unabridged quotation of 
the long passage drawn from Pareto’s Manuel that we have reproduced 
above: such passage, in fact, is of paramount importance for Hayek, because 
it confirms that the “first socialist interpretation of GET” runs foul of the 
reading of GET suggested, at least in his most mature works, by one of the 
very founders and most respected interpreters of the approach (Hayek, 1940, 
pp. 181-182). 
Yet Hayek’s 1940 paper is not so much concerned with the “the first 
socialist interpretation of GET”, but rather with the critical discussion of a 
new proposal, also known as the “competitive solution”, advanced in the 
second half of the 1930s by a group of socialist economists, later called the 
“market socialists”, whose best-known representatives are Lange, Lerner, and 
Dickinson21. The aim of the “market socialists” is to solve the calculation and 
allocation problems arising in a partially decentralized socialist economy 
with some competitive market traits. Their proposal, resting on an apparently 
realistic reinterpretation of GET that might be called the “second socialist 
                                                     
21 See, in particular, Lange (1936 and 1937), Lerner (1937 and 1938), and Dickinson 
(1939). 
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interpretation of GET”, lies at the center of  the third and last stage of the 
Socialist Calculation Debate. As their socialist predecessors in the preceding 
stage of the Debate, also the “market socialists” use a simple general 
equilibrium model to describe the economy they are concerned with. But, 
unlike their predecessors, they do not claim that an equilibrium of the 
economy can be directly computed by numerically solving the system of 
ordinary equations underlying the equilibrium model concerned; rather, they 
claim that such an equilibrium can be approached by trial and error, that is, 
by means of an iterative adjustment process which is nothing other than a 
“socialist” reinterpretation of the Walrasian tâtonnement, duly modified to 
take into account the partially decentralized socialist character of the 
economy. 
It should be recalled, at this point, that Walras, while starting from a 
highly realistic interpretation of the tâtonnement as an observable 
disequilibrium process in “real” time, had been forced to adopt a less and less 
“realistic” interpretation of the same construct in the hope of counteracting 
the logical and analytical difficulties arising from his original account: as we 
have seen before, with the adoption of the “hypothèse des bons” in the fourth 
edition of the Eléments, the Walrasian tâtonnement had eventually become an 
utterly unrealistic construct, where a purely virtual process, evolving in a sort 
of “logical” time, consumes no amount of “real” time to carry its effects 
through. But, of course, when Lange, the most analytically oriented of the 
“market socialists”, resurrects the Walrasian tâtonnement in the second half 
of the 1930s, he is forced, for obvious reasons, to adopt a much more 
concrete interpretation of that construct: for, after all, the revised tâtonnement 
is to become the pillar of a proposal of social and economic reform, aimed at 
reorganizing the actual functioning of the economy along “market socialist” 
lines, in the spirit of “social constructivism”. Hence Lange, unlike the last 
Walras, has to envisage his “socialist” tâtonnement as a process taking place 
in “real” time. Moreover, he has also to fill an apparent gap in Walras’s 
original story: for, while Walras had deliberately avoided specifying in detail 
who should be in charge of changing the prices (as well as the quantities 
produced, in the production models) in the course of the adjustment process, 
Lange cannot of course afford dodging this question. Being forced to assign 
the task of adjusting the state variables of the equilibration process to a well-
defined entity, Lange chooses to assign it to the Central Planning Board of 
his “market socialist” economy; this Board, therefore, is bound to become the 
ancestor of a much more ethereal character playing a central role in all the 
later formalized versions of the tâtonnement story, namely, the so-called 
“Walrasian auctioneer”. 
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In conclusion, barring Walras’s initial attempts at dressing up his own 
tâtonnement construct in realistic clothes, Lange’s “socialist” version of the 
tâtonnement paradoxically represents the most elaborate attempt at providing 
a fully-fledged interpretation of the competitive adjustment process as a 
“real” process taking place in “real” time in a supposedly “real” economy 
(albeit only a “market socialist” one). In so doing, however, Lange 
unwillingly lays bare all the difficulties inherent in that construct, difficulties 
which had already emerged in the realistic versions of the tâtonnement 
initially put forward by Walras and could only be concealed by his final 
adoption of the “hypothèse des bons” and the consequent virtualization of the 
entire process. 
It is then relatively easy for Hayek, in his 1940 contribution, to disclose 
the inner contradictions of the “second socialist interpretation of GET” and, 
especially, of the associated “socialist” version of the tâtonnement story: for 
all such contradictions are ultimately related to the pretence of constructing 
an observable disequilibrium process in “real” time, without renouncing, at 
the same time, the traditional assumption of parametric rationality which 
characterizes the agents’ maximizing behavior in all general equilibrium 
models of Walrasian derivation; and this dilemma, as can be seen, is 
essentially the same as the one in which Walras himself had been caught 
when he had tried to develop a realistic version of the tâtonnement construct 
providing a link between the “theoretical” and the “practical” solution of each 
of his equilibrium models. In essence, and with specific reference to the kind 
of economy envisaged by the “market socialists”, Lange’s “socialist” version 
of the tâtonnement can be blamed, according to Hayek, for the following 
reasons: first, it is unable to explain why the agents (and especially the 
production managers of the state-owned industries) should “stupidly” behave 
as price-takers, while knowing that the prices would be changed by the 
Central Planning Board whenever the economy is out of equilibrium; second, 
it is unable to account for the agents’ disequilibrium behavior, even if, with 
the proposed method of price fixing and changing, disequilibrium should be 
expected to be the norm in any such “market socialist” economy; third, in the 
hope to make the equilibrium position determinate, it is forced to 
inconsistently assume away, once again in the wake of the early Walras, all 
changes in the data, even those changes that would necessarily follow from 
the agents’ out-of-equilibrium behavior22. 
Having disposed of both the “first” and the “second socialist interpretation 
of GET”, and having perceived that misguided views about the meaning and 
possible uses of the notion of economic equilibrium abound, even among 
                                                     
22 See Hayek (1940, pp. 188, 193-194, 197-198). 
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well-trained general equilibrium theorists, at the beginning of the 1940s 
Hayek feels obliged to explain his own position about the significance of the 
equilibrium approach in economics: in his intentions, of course, the proposed 
interpretation of GET should be consistent with the views expressed by the 
founders of the approach and, at the same time, should be free from the 
strictures that can be passed upon the “constructivist” readings of GET 
suggested by the “market socialists” and other economic planners during the 
Socialist Calculation Debate. 
As it turns out, Hayek’s suggested interpretation is nothing but a revised 
version of the reading of GET put forward by the last Pareto in the passages 
of the Manuel quoted at the end of the previous subsection. Yet, Hayek is 
also interested in showing that the sort of explanations we can expect from 
GET should be viewed as a particular instance of a larger class of 
explanations, recurring in the theoretical systems of the social sciences for 
reasons connected with the peculiar subject-matter of those sciences. All this 
is explained in the following passage, drawn from the first part of a long 
methodological essay, in three parts, written by Hayek in the period 1942-
1944: 
The number of separate variables which in any particular social 
phenomenon will determine the result of a given change will as a rule be far 
too large for any human mind to master and manipulate them effectively. In 
consequence our knowledge of the principle by which these phenomena are 
produced will rarely if ever enable us to predict the precise result of any 
concrete situation. While we can explain the principle on which certain 
phenomena are produced and can from this knowledge exclude the possibility 
of certain results, e.g. of certain events occurring together, our knowledge will 
in a sense be only negative, i.e. it will merely enable us to preclude certain 
results but not enable us to narrow the range of possibilities sufficiently so that 
only one remains. 
To these general remarks concerning the distinctive problems of 
explanation and prediction in the social sciences, Hayek adds the following 
sentences, which are directly relevant to the issue with which we are 
specifically concerned here: 
The distinction between an explanation merely of the principle on which a 
phenomenon is produced and an explanation which enables us to predict the 
precise result is of great importance for the understanding of the theoretical 
methods of the social sciences. […] The best illustration in the field of the 
social sciences is probably the general theory of prices as represented, e.g., by 
the Walrasian or Paretian systems of equations. These systems show merely the 
principle of coherence between the prices of the various types of commodities 
of which the system is composed, but without knowledge of the numerical 
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values of all the constants which occur in it and which we never do know, this 
does not enable us to predict the precise results which any particular change 
will have. Quite apart from this particular case, a set of equations which shows 
merely the form of a system of relationships but does not give the values of the 
constants contained in it, is perhaps the best general illustration of an 
explanation merely of the principle on which any phenomenon is produced. 
(Hayek, 1942, pp. 290-291)23
This passage, written by Hayek at the end of an important historical 
controversy, has the merit of clarifying the methodological foundations 
underlying two alternative interpretations of GET, recurrently advocated by 
opposing groups of economic theorists, social reformers and policy makers 
since the beginning of the approach: on the one hand we find theorists like 
Hayek himself or the last Pareto who, believing that general equilibrium 
models can only provide “explanations merely of the principle”, dismiss any 
attempt to use GET as a computing device or a policy tool as a dangerous 
“constructivistic” abuse; on the other hand, we find economists like the 
supporters of the “first socialist interpretation of GET” or, in a subtler way, 
the advocates of the “second socialist interpretation” as well, who, believing 
that general equilibrium models  enable the social scientist to “predict the 
precise result of any concrete situation”, encourage the use of GET for 
computing or policy purposes. 
Now, while Hayek’s arguments in the Socialist Calculation Debate appear 
more convincing than those offered by his opponents, and while it can fairly 
be said that he comes out of the Debate as the undisputed winner, it is by no 
means clear that Hayek’s (or, for that matter, the last Pareto’s) interpretation 
of GET as the source of “explanations merely of the principle” is the only 
one to survive to the historical controversy. As a matter of fact, before the 
Debate, the alternative interpretation of GET as the provider of 
“explanations” or “predictions of the precise result” had already been 
conspicuously present in the then relatively small general equilibrium 
community: as we have seen, in fact, after occasionally tempting Walras 
himself, such interpretation had been explicitly endorsed by no less than the 
early Pareto. Then, after the Debate, the potentially “deterministic” or 
“constructivistic” interpretation of GET, instead of dwindling or 
disappearing, as one might perhaps have expected, has gone on thriving: in 
particular, it has directly affected the continuously growing and by now huge 
                                                     
23 In a footnote appended to the passage cited in the text Hayek, with a view to 
strengthening his position, reproduces once again the passage from Pareto’s Manuel, as well as 
the passage from Cournot’s Recherches quoted in subsection 3.2 above. 
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literature on the computation of economic equilibria24. These historical 
vicissitudes cannot but mean that, in spite of all methodological caveats put 
forward by influential theorists, the very structure of GET is such as to foster 
(or, at the very least, not to discourage) the temptation to read the theory 
through “deterministic” or “constructivistic” lenses. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
For the founder of GET, Léon Walras, the “theoretical” solution of a 
general equilibrium model is the mathematical solution of the system of 
ordinary equations defining its structure: it implicitly defines an equilibrium 
of the model; the “practical” solution, instead, is the stationary solution of the 
system of functional equations describing the adjustment process brought 
about by the competitive market mechanism. According to Walras, for any 
given model the two solutions should coincide: the theory of the tâtonnement 
should take care of showing how the adjustment process converges to a 
“practical” solution, which also coincides with the “theoretical” solution of 
the model. 
Very often, but not invariably, Walras takes for granted that the 
“theoretical” solution or the equilibrium of a given model exists and is 
unique. However, even under the most favourable assumption of equilibrium 
existence and uniqueness, Walras supposes that “in almost all cases” the 
“theoretical” solution cannot be computed. He assumes, however, that the 
competitive market mechanism  typically drives the adjustment process 
towards the “practical” solution or, in view of the assumed coincidence 
between the two solutions, towards the “theoretical” solution as well. In view 
of this, the “theoretical” solution, even if not directly computable, indirectly 
acquires an empirical character, which is conferred upon it by the competitive 
market mechanism underlying the adjustment process. 
Since, according to Walras, the empirical content of the theory ultimately 
depends on the convergence of the adjustment process to the “theoretical” 
solution, the theory of the tâtonnement, which deals precisely with the 
adjustment process, comes to play a fundamental role in Walras’s overall 
construction. But Walras’s theory of the tâtonnement is defective: starting 
from a highly realistic interpretation of the tâtonnement as an observable 
disequilibrium process in “real” time, Walras progressively realizes that such 
an interpretation is inconsistent with the fundamental premises of his theory 
and, especially, with the assumed coincidence of the “practical” solution with 
                                                     
24 See, e.g., Scarf (1982) and Kehoe (1991). 
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the “theoretical” one. For this reason, in the fourth edition of the Eléments 
(1900), Walras eventually resolves to make an assumption, the so-called 
“hypothèse des bons”, which turns the tâtonnement process into a purely 
virtual process in “logical” time, taking just one instant of “real” time to drive 
the economy towards an equilibrium state. In this way some of the analytical 
problems arising in the previous versions of the tâtonnement are made to 
disappear, but all the realistic flavor surrounding the construct is lost. 
This is one of the reasons why Pareto progressively trims down the role of 
Walras’s tâtonnement in his overall system of thought: while paying lip-
service to that construct in the Cours (1896-97), he ends up by completely 
neglecting it in the Manuale (1906) and the Manuel (1909). Together with the 
tâtonnement, also the notion of “practical” solution disappears from Pareto’s 
theoretical framework, so that Walras’s notion of “theoretical” solution, 
simply referred to as an “equilibrium” by Pareto, is the only one to survive. 
The disappearance from the picture of Walras’s tâtonnement, however, 
does not induce Pareto, at least at the beginning of his scientific career, to 
revise his positivistic attitude towards the empirical character of GET or his 
optimistic expectations about the predictive power of the theory: on the 
contrary, in the Cours, he explicitly states that, provided that enough 
numerical data are collected and made available with the aid of statistics, 
GET can aspire at making numerical predictions as precise as those of 
mechanics, astronomy, and the natural sciences in general. 
This view, however, is bound to change dramatically over the years: in 
fact, in both the Manuale and the Manuel, Pareto makes it absolutely clear 
that, in view of the peculiar nature of the data of GET, the assumption that a 
complete knowledge of the relevant data of a certain economic model can  
somehow be acquired by the theorist is an “absurd hypothesis”; moreover, 
even if a complete knowledge of the data could ever be obtained, the 
computation of the equilibrium values of the unknown variables would all the 
same prove impossible, due to the unmanageable complexity of the equation 
system to be solved. 
Pareto’s arguments are taken up again and further developed by Hayek in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s, during the last two stages of the so-called 
Socialist Calculation Debate: in contrast with the “socialist interpretations of 
GET” put forward by various groups of socialist economists from the late 
1920s to the end of the 1930s, interpretations which aim at turning GET into 
a computing device or a tool for implementing social and economic reforms, 
Hayek reiterates the last Pareto’s view of GET as a theoretical system that 
cannot provide “explanations” or “predictions of the precise result”, but can 
only yield “explanations of the principle on which a phenomenon is 
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produced”. A cursory glance at the history of GET, however, cannot but 
confirm that there is no general consensus among theorists and scholars about 
the possibility or impossibility of using GET for computing equilibria or 
making numerical predictions of the phenomena falling under its jurisdiction. 
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